The article examines the features of the US foreign policy towards the Central Asian states in the post-bipolar period. The imperatives and constants, as well as the transformation of Washington’s Central Asian policy, have been characterized. It is shown that five Central Asian states have been in the focus of American foreign policy over the past thirty years. In the process of shaping the US foreign policy in Central Asia, the presence of significant reserves of energy and mineral resources in the region was of great importance. Therefore, rivalry for Caspian energy resources and their transportation routes came to the fore. In addition to diversifying transport and logistics flows and supporting American companies, the US energy policy in Central Asia was aimed at preventing the restoration of Russia’s economic and political influence, as well as countering the penetration of China, which is interested in economic cooperation with the countries of the region. During the period under review, the following transformation of mechanisms and means of Washington’s policy in the Central Asian direction was observed: the policy of “exporting democracy”; attempts to “nurture” the pro-American elite; striving to divide states into separate groups with permanent “appointment” of leaders; involvement in a unified military system to combat terrorism; impact on the consciousness of the population in order to destabilize geopolitical rivals; building cooperation on a pragmatic basis due to internal difficulties and external constraints. Central Asian states sympathized with the American course because of their interest in technology and investment. At the same time, these states in every possible way distanced themselves from the impulses of “democratization” from Washington. Kazakhstan was a permanent regional ally of the United States, to which Uzbekistan was striving to join. The second echelon in relations with the American side was occupied by Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. A feature of the positions of the Central Asian countries is the maximum benefit from cooperation with Washington while building good-neighborly relations with Russia and China, which is in dissonance with the regional imperatives of the United States. In the future, the American strategy in Central Asia will presumably proceed from the expediency of attracting regional allies and stimulating contradictions in order to contain geopolitical rivals in the region.