The Black Sea region is an important geopolitical and geostrategic area where the interests of various authors of world politics — both regional and global — intersect. The importance of the region as a transit area of energy resources and an important transport hub attracts the attention of the European Union as well. The EU’s interests in the Black Sea region cover a number of areas: economy, energy transit, security, environmental and climate issues, social and cultural initiatives. Energy and transport flows through the Black Sea region, as well as access to broad markets, are key factors in the EU’s interest in the region. Since the 1990s, the European Union has consistently increased its interest in the Black Sea region. Among the key initiatives in this direction, it is necessary to highlight the “Black Sea Synergy” and the “Eastern Partnership” program, which allow the EU to progressively increase its presence in the region and influence individual countries geographically related to it. The EU’s attention to the region and its policies are in conflict with the foreign policy interests of the Russian Federation in this geographical area.

The article presents an analysis of the current strategic documents of eight countries, permanent members of the Arctic Council (Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Canada, USA, Russia). Considering the trends in the development of the Arctic region, the analysis provides an opportunity to determine the main priorities of the Arctic states, to find common goals and features of their approaches in this process. There are three potentially consolidating components of the eight states: the main role of the Arctic Council in international cooperation, sustainable development of the region and ensuring security. In this regard, Arctic states need to develop common principles for the prosperity of the region, primarily security.

The article analyses the U.S. policy in Central Asia with the focus on the policy of the Trump administration. It highlights its main areas of interests and features, examines the U.S. bilateral relations with Central Asian countries.

The American interest in the region was manifested immediately after the collapse of the USSR and was linked to its geostrategic position and energy resources. Initially, the efforts of the White House were focused on the elimination of Soviet weapons and the promotion of business contacts. The role of Central Asia in the U.S. foreign policy increased when the military operation in Afghanistan was launched. With the achievement of agreements on the use of military infrastructure in Central Asia states, the U.S. military presence in the region significantly expanded, and cooperation through defense agencies began to actively develop. Contacts in the economic area intensified, dozens of American companies rushed to Central Asian countries, and the volume of American investments increased significantly. In order to form pro-American societies and elites, the work to promote “democratic values” has been intensified.

With the arrival of the Trump administration, the emphasis was shifted towards military cooperation. Military-technical cooperation, joint military maneuvers and educational programs, exchange of experience in the field of combating terrorism, illegal migration, human trafficking and drug trafficking have increased. Business contacts, trade, economic and energy cooperation have been intensified. Washington has somewhat reduced the degree of criticism of the Central Asian countries for “problems in the area of democratic governance”, nevertheless, the U.S. continues its attempts to democratize the region through NGOs sponsored by non-state funds close to the American Democratic Party.

The Central Asian region will remain in the focus of the U.S. foreign policy for a long period of time, regardless of whether the Republican or Democratic administration is in power, taking into account its geostrategic position, natural resources, situation in Afghanistan, desire to weaken the positions of Russia and China in this area.

The Mediterranean Sea consisting of numerous seas is enclosed by three continents — Europe, Asia and Africa. It is a specific phenomenon in terms of geography, oceanology and world history. This is the only place in the world where many cultures and civilizations mutually enriching each other and giving to the world the benchmarks for development have appeared and alternated. As E. Bradford wrote “Each part of the Mediterranean Sea is really specific. One is apt to violence, other is more serene, the third is prone to periodical outbursts of fervor, the fourth is dangerous and unpredictable as schizophrenic.” The therapy of nature and man that lasted for many centuries has played its positive role having turned the Mediterranean into the center of trade, fishery and tourism. The countries surrounding the sea (there are twenty-one of them) are well described and well known that is why we concentrate on eleven water areas each of which makes a part in the general Mediterranean Sea puzzle.

The factor of the sea improves our perception of the land-sea interface and this can be described in such comprehensive scientific and popular publication as encyclopedia. Today when Russia with all its navy power returns to the World Ocean, in particular to the Mediterranean, using its renovated Mediterranean fleet the extension of navigation knowledge in this water area which had always been in the focus of tsars, emperors and presidents of Russia becomes a very important factor.

In the context of tough geopolitical and economic competition, the development of Russian-Uzbek economic cooperation is of particular importance in terms of promoting Eurasian integration and forming the economic partnership belt of Russia. The economic potential, the level of diversification of industries and their technological effectiveness, and a balanced strategy of foreign economic cooperation of Uzbekistan contribute to the achievement of these goals to the greatest extent.

In this context, the article aims to identify promising areas for the development of economic cooperation based on a comprehensive assessment of the state, risks and potential of economic cooperation. The study uses methods of economic analysis, systematic assessment of the state and prospects of development of various areas of cooperation between countries.

The main factor in increasing the intensity of trade and economic cooperation between Russia and Uzbekistan is the new track of political and economic guidelines, changes in domestic economic policy, and the liberalization of currency exchange operations. Internal reforms have become a stimulating platform for activating bilateral agreements on expanding cooperation, which is reflected in the growth of mutual trade turnover, promotion and activation of investment and industrial cooperation projects. The intensification of Russian-Uzbek economic cooperation will help balance the centers of power in regional integration.

This article considers the concept of «digital economy», which many countries of the world are interested in creating. The characteristics of the digital economy, which is based on trade using the Internet, are clarified. The role of the digital economy as a factor of investment and innovation growth is revealed. Special emphasis is placed on the development of the digital economy of modern Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan’s approaches to the development of the digital economy are identified, and the ways of its creation in Kazakhstan are analyzed. Considerable attention is paid to the study of indicators of the current state of digitalization of Kazakhstan in accordance with the indicators of annual international ratings. The problems hindering the digitalization of the country’s economy are highlighted.

The author traces the evolution of the conceptual foundations of Russia’s migration policy and the features of its implementation at various stages of social, economic and political development of the country. The analysis focuses on the geopolitical specifics of Russia’s migration policy: after the collapse of the USSR, tens of millions of the country’s citizens ended up abroad. Return to the sources of the conceptualization of the Russian migration policy, capture of the underrated factors has a significant practical importance to mainstream and optimize it nowadays. Contradictory tendencies in the development of migration processes, unrealized opportunities, mistakes and miscalculations made in the first post-Soviet years are revealed; all the positive things that have been brought into the migration sphere over three decades are noted. The author identifies several stages that have their peculiarities that characterize the dynamics of changes and the evolution of the conceptual approaches of the state to this very complex and multi-layered problem. And at each stage there is a difficult search for answers to unresolved old and new questions that life poses to Russia with its contradictions, illogisms, and paradoxes. The author concludes that the coronavirus pandemic, which caused global social and economic upheavals in the world, will become a force majeure test for Russia’s migration policy.

The local elections results in Ukraine, taken place in October 2020, recorded changes in the main political forces alignment. The pro-presidential «Servant of the People» party has lost the electorate support. This further weakened the Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky standings. At the same time, during the local elections, the popular classes supported the pro-Eu-ropean party of the former President Petro Poroshenko. His political party “European Solidarity” managed to gain a significant number of votes in regional and city councils in almost all Ukraine territorial entities. The «Opposition Platform — For Life» party, oriented towards the South-East Ukrainian electorate, received a high level of support. A distinctive feature of the local elections was the voters’ interest decline in radical nationalist parties. The results of local elections reflected changes in the voters mood. The key factor was the economic problems which the Ukrainian authorities faced. As a result, the President of Ukraine and his political party have lost support among the population, which in the future will increase the rivalry between the official Kiev and regional authorities.

The article explores the ideological origins of Ukrainian radical nationalism, the formation and evolution of far-right political forces in post-Communist Ukraine, and the ideology of contemporary radical right-wing Ukrainian parties. Ukrainian far-right nationalism originated in the 1920s-30s. Its political embodiment was the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) which operated in Eastern Poland. Ideological foundation of the OUN was the concept of integral nationalism elaborated by Dmytro Dontsov. The OUN proclaimed the creation of Ukrainian sovereign state as its most important goal. The characteristic features of the ideology of Ukrainian radical far-right nationalism of that era were the priority of the interests of the Ukrainian nation, Russophobia, anti-communism, anti-liberalism, and the cult of power. Modern Ukrainian radical nationalists have adopted many of these concepts. In the 1990s, a number of extreme right-wing organizations emerged in Ukraine that declared themselves heirs of the traditions of Ukrainian nationalists of the first half of the XX^th century. Some of the newly created parties tend towards integral nationalism, while others tend towards social nationalism, which combines ethnic nationalism with the idea of social justice. At the same time, all Ukrainian radical nationalists are characterized by an ethnic interpretation of the nation, a desire to create a mono-ethnic Ukrainian state, a negative attitude towards Russia and Russians, anti-communism, and commitment to the “third way” in economy. Critical of European liberal values, the Ukrainian far-right radicals are nonetheless in favor of Ukraine joining the EU and NATO, hoping that Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration will distance it from Russia. Ukrainian radical nationalists actively participated in Euromaidan 2013-2014 and the overthrow of Victor Yanukovych’s regime. However, they have never (with the exception of the 2012 parliamentary elections) achieved any significant success in the elections to the Verkhovna Rada. Only a part of the population of Galicia votes for them. At the same time, some ideas previously put forward by the Ukrainian far right have in recent years to a certain extent entered the ideological baggage of respectable pro-European right-wing parties in Ukraine. Thus, the ideological and political influence of the Ukrainian far-right nationalists is more significant than it would be possible to assume based only on their electoral support.

There are studied political, social and other grounds of formation of the Transdniestrian political elite and civil society as self-sustained political phenomena. These institutes have been developing not isolatedly but in the framework of those political processes that were typical for the region during the period of its establishment and existence in different social and political conditions. There are summarized and analyzed different aspects of the Ukrainian factor impact over these processes as by direct influence of the Ukrainian political elite and civil society, as well as in the context of ideological concepts formulated in the Ukrainian political discourse during a long period of time.

Concrete methods of the Ukrainian political class impact over the Transdniestrian political elite and civil society are also presented. A very special activity of the Ukrainian side could be seen up to 2014, when the Transdniestrian political elite had been considered in Kiev as an independent subject with its own interests that in its turn determined the choice of certain forms of impact. Direct inter-elite communication used to be one of the most meaningful forms of such impact, that allowed to identify the sides’ interests and to find mutually acceptable decisions on the highest and high levels.

Since 2014 the situation has changed dramatically. The Ukrainian political elite refuses to recognize the Transdniestrian political elite’s status of a separate (independent) subject and considers it to be a tool for the Russia’s interests’ implementation. There appears a special role of the border factor as of a key resource for pressure over the Transdniestrian political elite, its business interests, options for traffic etc. The same way the Ukrainian side minimized contacts with the Transdniestrian civil society. But at the same time Ukrainians keep for themselves the option for monitoring the Transdniestrian political system.

In the Ukrainian political narrative there appears a contradiction, when the Ukrainian political authorities can’t use a symbolic potential of a number of Transdniestrian locations, actual for the modern political ideology of Ukraine only because that these locations are situated on the territory controlled by the Transdniestrian political elite whilst Ukrainians avoid any contacts with the latter.

The article is devoted to the methodological approaches that reveal the essence of the term «Central Asia». After the collapse of the USSR, five Post-Soviet States located in the center of Eurasia, adopted the international name of the region «Central Asia» instead of the soviet term «Central Asia and Kazakhstan». However, at the present stage, the accepted Post-Soviet geopolitical term raises many questions and requires a detailed description. The author analyzes the essence of the term «Central Asia» through the prism of historical, geographical and geopolitical approaches. It is concluded that the historical and geographical borders of the region do not coincide with the borders of the political term «Central Asia». Famous Western and Russian geopolitics are trying to present the region within broader geopolitical boundaries which is due to the geographical features of the region and its hydrocarbon potential. As a result the term “Central Asia” is interpreted differently by researchers.